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INTRODUCTION
Twenty-five years ago I was honored to be invited to participate
in a contract law conference sponsored by New York University in
conjunction with the publication of the N.Y. U. Annual Survey of
American Law.' My specific assignment was to assess the impact of
law and economics scholarship on contract law. I responded by conducting an empirical study of judicial citations to selected law and
economics works in order to ascertain the extent to which judges
seemed to be relying on the teachings of law and economics. In
* Stephen C. O'Connell Chair and Professor of Law, University of Florida
College of Law. Thanks to Ben Goodman and Sarah Harrison for their assistance.
1. See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Trends and Traces: A Preliminary Evaluation of Economic Analysis in Contract Law, 1988 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. LAw 73 (1988).
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effect, the effort was part of a general question that concerns all law
professors: Does scholarship matter?
With the permission of the editors of the N.Y U.Annual Survey
of American Law, I have repeated the study with respect to the scholarship sample selected twenty-five years ago. In addition, I have supplemented and expanded the sample of scholarship to include
works appearing since the initial effort. The results of that project
are the focus of this article. This examination suggests that law and
economics scholarship has had two uses. First, it has provided a new
rationale for many traditional contract rules. As one would expect,
this means it is most likely to be invoked when there are pressures
to change the law. Second, although the quantity of citations remains modest, it is clear that law and economics scholarship, at
least in the context of contract law, has affected the vocabulary and
reasoning of courts.
Before discussing those results, I address a number of preliminary matters. First, it is useful to understand the methodology, its
limitations both now and twenty-five years ago, and the results of
that earlier study. Section II is devoted to these matters. Second, it
is important to understand the different scholarly landscapes of the
late 1980s and the present. In fact, since my initial offering, two
3
important areas of study-behavioral economics 2 and happiness -

have come to influence the economic approach to law and possibly
also contract law. The discussion is found in Section III. Finally, in
Section IV, the empirical results are presented and discussed. Both
quantitative and qualitative assessments are made.
I.
SEARCHING FOR THE IMPACT OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS: THE INITIAL STUDY
In the 1988 version of this effort, 4 I selected fifty-eight books
and articles that could fairly be described as involving economics
and contract law. 5 The selection was not random. My sample was
composed of articles that were well placed as far as the prestige of
the journal and were ones I was generally familiar with as having
important implications for the field. As examples, several articles
2. See infra pp. 9-13.
3. See infra pp. 13-16.
4. The actual research of the original study was undertaken in 1987.
5. It would not be accurate to say that all of those selected "applied" economics to law because some were critical of the economic approach. See, e.g., Peter
Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies-Efficiency, Equity, and the Second Restatement, 81 COLtIM. L. REv. 111 (1981).
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coauthored by Charles Goetz and Robert Scott were included, as
well as a series of articles by Richard Epstein. 6 Two books were included.7 One was Richard Posner's An Economic Analysis of Law,8

and the other was A. Mitchell Polinsky's An Introduction to Law and
Economics.9 If anything, one could argue that the selection of the
articles and books was biased toward overstating the influence of
law and economics since it was disproportionately composed of
works by some of the leading authorities of the era.
Using the Westlaw database "allcases" I determined the frequency of citation for each work in the sample. Half of the works of
the fifty-eight selected were not cited in any case found in the "allcases" database. In fact, there were only seventy-six citations to the
selected works in total. Only sixty-four separate cases had cited the
works, owing to the fact that some cases cited more than one work
from the sample.
In each instance of a citation, the work was classified as either
having no apparent impact on the decision, having its economic
logic recognized although not apparently influencing the outcome,
or having actually influenced the outcome. A citation was placed in
the first category if the work was cited in a string-cite or for a proposition unrelated to law and economics. This does not mean the
work did not support the opinion. To be in the second category, a
citation had to involve an express recognition of the economic analysis of the issue. If the court seemed to adopt the economic analysis
of the work as persuasive, it was included in the final category.' 0 In
nineteen of the sixty-four cases, I felt it was fair to say that econom6. These are all identified in Appendix A.
7. The analysis was confined to citations to the parts of the books that were
devoted to contract law.
8. At the time of the original survey, Judge Posner's book was in its second
edition. Currently it is in its seventh. Citations found here are to the seventh edition, which was published in 2007.
9. The Polinsky book was in its first edition at the time of the original study. It
is now in its fourth edition.
10. As an example, consider the following from DAR & Associates, Inc.
v. Uniforce Services, Inc., 37 F. Supp. 2d 192, 201 (E.D.N.Y. 1999):
Contracting parties have an incentive to negotiate a liquidated damages clause
whenever the costs of such a negotiation are less than the expected costs resulting from their reliance on the standard compensatory damages rule for
breach of contract. See CharlesJ. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, LiquidatedDamages,
Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model
and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 Col.L.Rev. 554, 559 (1977). This incentive
was present here with respect to a prospective breach by DAR of the noncompete and nonsolicitation clauses.
The court then went on to apply the analysis to the facts in the case.
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ics scholarship had influenced the outcome.1" At the time, I ex12
pressed surprise that the works had been cited so infrequently.
The results of that previous study are found in Appendix A to this
work.
The current effort returns to the fifty-eight works in the original sample. In Appendix A, citations to those works in cases decided since 1987 are marked with an asterisk. In addition, I added
twenty-two newer works to the sample. The selection process for the
additional twenty-two was similar to that for the original fifty-eight. I
selected well-placed articles that seemed to me to have important
implications for contract law. These are found in Appendix B. Citation checks and classifications were applied to this second group.
For reasons that will be discussed later, a separate examination was
made of the citations of articles concentrating on behavioral economics. In Section III, I discuss the results and implications of that
second study.
At this point, however, it is important to ask whether anything
of importance can be gleaned from this methodology. Clearly a
great deal of caution is in order, but I believe the answer is yes. I
advise caution because there are a multitude of ways in which economic reasoning, and even specific law and economics works, may
influence judges without resulting in a citation. For example,
judges, clerks, and attorneys may have been exposed to the economic approach and this may be reflected in the logic expressed in
an opinion. Thus a lack of citation does not mean a specific work
was not influential.
In addition, if a court has already adopted a position that is
consistent with a law and economics approach, but it did not rely
on economics when the position was initially adopted, the court
may have little incentive to turn to economics for support. For example, it is fair to say that a law and economics approach is one that
13
favors more frequent enforcement of liquidated damages clauses.
But if a court already has adopted that approach, it is less inclined
to feel the need to bolster its position by noting the economic logic
11. This number may be misleading. Although there were nineteen instances
of "influence," the cases only cited a total of nine works. See Harrison, supra note 1,
at 80.
12. This reflected my own belief that law professors wrote to influence law
and would therefore be relied upon byjudges. Now, of course, I recognize the lack
of logic in this deduction.
13. See RicHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANAvsis Or LAW 127-130 (7th ed.
2007).
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offered by scholars in the field.1 4 In fact, one would expect greater
appeal to outside authority to occur when a court is inclined to
modify the law or prefers to resist an existing trend.
Perhaps the best example of this phenomenon is reliance on
the notion of the efficient breach. 15 The theory of the efficient
breach provides an economic justification for awarding expectancy
damages but no more. As of late 2011, using the database "allcases,"
the term "efficient breach" was found 131 times. Several of the earliest "hits" were in the context of decisions involving liquidated
damages. The courts cited a well-known article on that subject by
Charles Goetz and Robert Scott, the title of which included "efficient breach."' 6 The first example of the use of the term in ajudicial opinion that seemed to suggest approval of the economic
theory was not until 1984.17 Yet the expectancy measure of damages
was established well over a century before that time. 18 In short, wellsettled law is not likely to require a great deal of defense or explanation by way of academic authority.
Conversely, as a general matter one would expect more cites to
scholarship when an area of law is in flux. A lower court adopting a
novel or even slightly varied version of an existing rule may well feel
that citations and discussion will lower the risk of reversal. Similarly,
a court resisting a trend in the law may feel inclined to demonstrate
scholarly support for its position. For example, one item in the original sample was Richard Epstein's 1984 article, "In Defense of the
14. For additional discussion on enforcement of liquidated damages clauses,
see Kenneth W. Clarkson, Roger LeRoy Miller & TimothyJ. Muris, Liquidated Damages v. Penalties:Sense or Nonsense?, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 351; CharlesJ. Goetz & Robert
E. Scott, LiquidatedDamages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle:Some Notes
on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 554

(1977).
15. The logic of the efficient breach goes like this: Suppose A contracts to sell
a car to B for $2000. The car is to be delivered in one week. When performance is
due, the market value of the car is $2500. At the same time, C offers A $3000 for

the car. Under the efficient breach theory, A should breach the contract with B,
pay $500 in damages to B, and sell the car to C. This outcome means A's position is
improved, B is not worse off, and C is also better off by virtue of receiving a car
which C values in excess of $3000. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND
ECONOMICS 189-90 (3rd ed. 2000). Of course, for the breach to be efficient in the

sense of increasing or leaving constant the utility of all participants, the monetary
compensation received by B must offset the loss in utility associated with the
breach. There is no reason to assume this is the case.
16. Goetz & Scott, supra note 14.
17. Rich & Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Dev., Inc., 157 Cal. App. 3d 1154, 1159

(Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
18. See A.W.B. SIMPSON,

LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL HISTORY

217-19 (2003).
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Contract at Will." 19 The article was written when there appeared to
be a trend toward changing the default position that employment
contracts were terminable at will. 20 Since the first iteration of this
study it has become the most cited article2' in both the original and
expanded sample and is always cited to support the terminable-at22
will standard.
Another limitation is that much of what is identified as economics is simply logic that one can apply without adopting a formal
economic perspective or referring to economic sources at all. 23 For
example, a great deal of contract law is about risk allocation. Thus
it responds to questions like: Is there liability for consequential
damages? Is the defendant liable even though an unexpected event
occurred that made performance more onerous? These issues were
dealt with well before law and economics scholars began writing
about them. And, for the most part, courts understood the concept
of allocating the risk to the party best able to bear it or insure
against it. The point is that courts seemingly unaffected by modern
economic arguments may tend to find other ways to achieve the
same outcome. In a sense these factors explain the focus of this
article. It is intended to be more about the influence of law and
economics scholarship on contract law than an assessment of the
general presence of economic reasoning by those deciding contract
law matters.
One final factor that falls into this general category of disclaimers is a function of the twenty-five years between the initial study
and this follow up. Writing about opinions in 1987 meant studying
the works of judges who most likely were only moderately, if at all,
acquainted with the "law and economics" movement. It seems
equally likely that the attorneys attempting to persuade those
judges were only slightly more familiar with overtly economicsbased arguments. Thus if economics played a role, there was a
much greater likelihood it would be based on the scholarship of the
19. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947
(1984).
20. See generally Jeffrey L. Harrison, The "New" Terminable-at-Will Employment
Contract:An Interest and Cost Incidence Analysis, 69 IOwA L. REv. 327 (1984) (noting
that employees formerly terminable at will were being afforded some job security).
21. Judge Posner's The Economic Analysis of Law remains the most frequently
cited work.
22. Citations are found in Appendix A.
23. Richard Posner makes the case that much of the common law was efficient well before the advent of the theory of law and economics. POSNER, supra
note 13, at 249.
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day, rather than on a generalized understanding of law and economics by those involved.
Twenty-five years later, the situation may be quite different. In
this period, an economic approach is discussed in most law schools.
Even those soon-to-be-judges and attorneys who have not taken a
formal course in law and economics are likely to have been subjected to concepts like efficient breach or the economics of reliance. This factor would lean toward less citation, which could be
misleading in terms of influence. In other words, law and economics scholarship might play a role in a decision by becoming part of
the intellectual consciousness of ajudge or an attorney, rather than
24
by the direct influence of a single scholarly work.
With these limitations in mind, each reader may have different
interpretations of the results. Two things seem clear. First, despite
limitations on what may be inferred from citation frequency, it
seems likely that citations to a sample are a general indicator of the
tendency to rely on scholarship in a particular field. Second, citations to works that rely on a mode of reasoning will be correlated
with the more general influence of that type of reasoning.2 5 Here
again, however, caution is advised. Once scholarship is cited to support a position, future courts may simply refer to the earlier citing
case rather than to the scholarship. Consequently, a decline in citations does not mean the influence of the scholarship has declined.
One general conclusion is that citation to law and economics
scholarship in the context of contract law opinions is not a common occurrence. In 1987, the original fifty-eight works had been
cited seventy-six times. Twenty-five years later, the citation count for
the original sample had grown to 204. Reliance on Judge Posner's
The Economic Analysis of Law has increased proportionately when
compared to the other works in the study. Omitting the citations to
Judge Posner's book, the citation count for the initial study drops
to fifty-seven, and in the follow-up to 132. Evidence of direct influence of law and economics scholarship is also rare. As already
24. This effort does not include a comparison of the influences of different
approaches to contract law. For example, no effort has been made to compare the
influence of law and economics scholarship with relational contracts scholarship.
Interestingly, under "allcases" using WestLaw, the term "relational contract" is
found twenty-two times as of December 2011. In many instances the citation is to
an article by CharlesJ. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principlesof Relational Contracts,67
VA. L. REv. 1089 (1981), which is itself fairly regarded as part of the law and economics literature.
25. Empirical assessments based on relative frequency of citation of works representing different contract law philosophies might be an interesting undertaking.
These are not part of this effort.
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noted, in the original study I found nineteen instances in which a
court seemed to be expressly influenced by an economic argument. 26 In the past twenty-five years there were twelve more of these

instances. This may not be unique to law and economics but is noteworthy because no other approach to law that I know of has been as
broad in scope and as intellectually aggressive with its announcements of what the law should be.
When writing twenty-five years ago, I noted five trends in contract law: erosion of the terminable-at-will rule, greater reliance on
promissory estoppel, greater incidence of excuse from performance
when it has become more difficult, routine awarding of specific performance, and enforcement of liquidated damages clauses. 2 7 It was
impossible to conclude that the economic literature at the time had
played much of a role except perhaps in the case of liquidated damages clauses. 28 Although the influence of law and economics scholarship is doubtful, the trends themselves are generally consistent
with the teachings of law and economics.
II.
THE SHIFTING NATURE OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS SCHOLARSHIP
When this effort was initially undertaken, mainstream law and
economics was linked closely to the idea that individuals are rational maximizers of self-interest. 29 Rationality in this context
means the ability to make consistent decisions. 30 Self-interest is a bit
difficult to pin down, but essentially it means not making decisions
simply out of a sense of duty3' or making choices that are "counterpreferential." 3 2 Thus individuals were assumed to be rational maxi26. This trend did not increase in the post 1987 period. See Section IV, infra.
27. Harrison, supra note 1, at 83-98.

28. Harrison supra note 1, at 98.
29. For a general discussion of these terms, see Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism,
Altruism and Market Illusions: The Limits of Law and Economics, 33 UCLA L. Rzv. 1309
(1986).

30. More specifically this means decisions that do not violate the law of transitivity. Thus if one prefers apples to oranges and oranges to pears, he would also
prefer apples to pears.
31. See Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 CoLum. L. REv. 1523, 1527 &
n.9 (1984).
32. Under some definitions of self-interest, it is impossible not to act in a selfinterested fashion. Every decision, even one that seems to be altruistic, is seen to
be consistent with "psychic utility." Amartya Sen, for one, argues for the possibility
of counter-preferential choice. Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theoy, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 328 (1977).
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mizers of their own utility. 33 Although prior to 1987 some questions
were raised about what "rationality" and "self-interest" meant, the
behavioral underpinnings of the economic analysis of law were relatively fixed and simple. In fairness it is important to note that pioneers in the field of law and economics understood that the validity
3 4
of their analysis hinged on the legitimacy of these assumptions.
During the past twenty-five years, these assumptions have come
under increased pressure from sociologists and economists. More
specifically, the fields of behavioral and experimental economics
have been closely examining the rationality assumption. Even more
recently, scholars have questioned what it is that people maximize. 3 5 In particular, if people seek to maximize utility, what does
that mean and what sorts of things are consistent with that goal?36

The current survey consequently takes place in the context of a
more skeptical law and economics literature than that which existed twenty-five years ago. This change in the tone of the scholarship is one variable that may affect reliance on law and economics
scholarship. Today it has a much more inward-looking quality. Two
examples of this more introspective approach come to mind: behavioral economics and the even more recent focus on the determinants of happiness. It is important to examine these two areas,
albeit briefly, to understand the ways they may alter judicial dependence on conventional economics scholarship.
A.

BehavioralEconomics

There is an extensive behavioral economics literature that I am
only able to touch on briefly here. 37 Nevertheless, the essence of
33. Id. at 322-24. Utility, as will be noted below, usually refers to expected as
opposed to actual utility. It is important to note that the utility of one person may
be tied to the perceived utility of another. In other words, a parent may increase
her utility by pleasing a child. Thus self-interest does not preclude interdependent
utility functions.
34. For a brief survey see Harrison, supra note 29, at 1320-22.
35. See infra pp. 13-16.
36. See generallyJeffrey L. Harrison, Happiness, Efficiency and the Promise of Decisional Equity: From Outcome to Process, 36 PEPP. L. REv. 935 (2009).
37. There is a vast number of articles in law alone that address the implications of behavioral economics. One of the earliest is Harrison, supra note 29. See
also Oren Bar-Gill, The BehavioralEconomics of Consumer Contracts, 92 M-Nm. L. REV.
749 (2008); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism,35 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1
(2007); Grant M. Hayden & Stephen E. Ellis, Law and Economics After Behavioral
Economics, 55 U. KAN. L. REv. 629 (2007); ChristineJolls, BehavioralEconomicsAnalysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1653 (1998); ChristineJolls, Cass R.
Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REv. 1471 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and BehavioralSci-
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what has been discovered falls into two categories. One is that even
if the assumption of self-interest is accepted, it is not clear what that
means. Maybe the best examples are games indicating that people
react to what they perceive as the fairness of an outcome. The second category concerns whether people are capable of rational
38
choices.
1. What is Self-Interest?
The problem with defining self-interest is illustrated by reference to ultimatum games. 39 In the simplest version of these games,
a certain amount of money is given to one party who must obtain
the permission of a partner in order to keep the sum. The initial
party is given a chance to make a one-time offer of a portion of the
money in order to persuade the partner to allow him to keep the
rest. If the partner says "no," neither party keeps any amount of the
sum offered. One would expect the offering party to offer a very
small amount and for the other party to say "yes." The explanation
of this is that a "yes" answer leaves both participants better off than
a "no" answer. The actual results, however, are that the offering
party generally offers more than a very small amount, but when he
does offer a small amount, that offer is rejected. In other words the
offeree opts to be worse off as a financial matter, a decision incon40
sistent with the rational self-interest maximization assumption.
There is, however, a way this decision can be viewed as consistent
with the assumption. The offeree who turns down the low offer includes a sense of fairness in his or her utility function and actually is
"better off." The problem is that this is not the conventional way
ence: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REv.
1051 (2000); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision
Making in Legal Scholarship:A LiteratureReview, 51 VAND. L. Riv. 1499 (1998); Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Tradedfor Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67 (2002).
38. This discussion begins infra note 45.
39. See generally Werner Guth, Rolf Schmittberger & Bernd Schwarze, An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 367, 368
(1982) (discussing individual self-interest in single and multi-stage bargaining

games).
40. An allocation that leaves at least one party better off and no one worse off
is said to be Pareto Superior. An allocation leaving at least one party worse off is

Pareto Inferior. When there are no allocations that could be Pareto Superior, the
current allocation is said to be Pareto Optimal. Paretian standards of efficiency are
attractive to some because they avoid the problem of interpersonal comparisons of
utility. In the example, rejecting the offer would appear to be a Pareto Inferior

move because it entails giving back the money offered. For a brief history of efficiency standards, see Harrison, supra note 36, at 942-46.
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economics is applied to law. Self-interest is typically a very narrow
41
concept that does not allow for complex emotional reactions.
A more interesting version of the ultimatum game is a classic
designed by Richard Thaler. Here subjects are asked the following
question:
You are lying on the beach on a hot day. All you have to drink
is ice water. For the last hour you have been thinking about
how much you would enjoy a nice cold bottle of your favorite
brand of beer. A companion gets up to go make a phone call
and offers to bring back a beer from the only nearby place
where beer is sold (a fancy resort hotel) [a small run-down grocery store]. He says that the beer might be expensive and so
asks how much you are willing to pay for the beer. He says that
he will buy the beer if it costs as much or less than the price
you state. But if it costs more than the price you state he will
not buy it. You trust your friend, and there is no possibility of
bargaining with the (bartender) [store owner]. What price do
42
you tell him?

In Thaler's experiment, the median answer was either $2.65 or
$1.50. The higher amount was offered by those buying from the
fancy resort and the lower amount was offered by those buying
from the run-down store. The beer, however, is exactly the same.
There are two possible interpretations, neither of which is in accord
with the standard economic model. One is that it exposes irrationality. In other words, how can the same beer be worth both no more
than $1.50 but also up to $2.65? The more promising possibility is
that the respondents had a sense of a fair price depending on who
the seller was, and this entered into their valuation of the beer.
In the realm of economic analysis, the same type of influence
may affect what is referred to as the efficient breach. Under that
theory, a party will breach a contract if he or she could compensate
the non-breaching party to the level of his expectancy and still
profit by virtue of the breach. This concept has been under fire for
43
some time, but not for reasons related to behavioral economics.

What behavioral economics suggests is that the decision to breach
may not be a simple matter of profit and loss. The potentially
breaching party could actually have a sense of whether it is fair to
breach and compensate the non-breaching party with the lowest
41. See generally Harrison, supra note 29, at 1320-26.
42. RICHARD THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES

AND ANOMALIES IN

Ec,

31 (1992).
43. See, e.g., Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA.
L.REV. 947, 963 (1982).
ONOMIC LIFE
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possible compensation consistent with leaving that party no worse
off, at least monetarily. More specifically, one could argue that it is
inefficient to breach in these instances because of the negative
psychic impact on the potentially breaching party. Put differently, a
party may be fully conscious of the fact that his or her wealth will
increase by breaching but also sense that breaking a promise is inconsistent with his or her own value system.
2. Questions of Rationality
Another facet of behavioral economics has less to do with what
people value and more to do with their capacity to process information and make decisions that maximize utility. The importance of
this problem is best understood in the context of the theory of "revealed preferences." In effect the standard economic model discovers what people prefer by examining the choices they make. Under
the classical model, choice and preference are locked together.
Thus when a choice is made it must be the one that delivers the
highest level of utility or satisfaction to the chooser. 44 Studies conducted in behavioral economics suggest this is not always the case.
A great deal has been written about bounded rationality and
cognitive biases. 4 5 As the term suggests, there are a number of limitations on arriving at a rational outcome. Indeed, it may be rational
to be irrational when the costs in terms of time and effort exceed
the marginal benefit. 46 Even aside from the costs of "rational" behavior, the ability to integrate and interpret information may simply
be beyond the capacity of many people. More importantly, there
are biases that tend to pull people away from the rational outcome.
For example, some exhibit an optimism bias in that they assume
incorrectly that the probability of a favorable outcome is higher
44. See Paul A. Samuelson, Consumption Theory in Terms of Revealed Preference, 15 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 243 (1948); Paul A. Samuelson, A Note on the Pure Theory
of Consumer's Behaviour, 5 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 61 (1938). See generally Harrison, supra
note 29, at 1316-21.
45. See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011); MASSIMO
PIATrELLI-PALMARINI, INEVrrABLE ILLUSIONS: How MISTAKES OF REASON RULE OUR
MINDS 4-5 (1994); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts,

and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203 (2003).
46. SeeJean Tirole, Rational Irrationality:Some Economics of Self-Management, 46
EURO. ECON. REv. 633, 644-46 (2002); Gary S. Becker, IrrationalBehavior and Economic Theory, 70J. POL. ECON. 1 (Feb. 1962). In other words, decisions that appear
to be inconsistent or to violate the law of transitivity may actually be rational when

the costs of additional time and information are factored into the analysis.
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than it actually is. 4 7 In other cases, individuals may be susceptible to
an anchoring effect. 48 That is, when asked to make a decision or
predict an outcome, they do not start from a clean slate but from an
anchoring point and adjust from there.
These biases have been studied and have important implications for public policy. 49 Some of this work was completed before
the first citation study in 1987.50 It was only after that time, however, that it began to find its way into mainstream legal scholarship.
What this means is that, since the first study, the range of what may
fairly be called law and economics literature has changed. On balance the new work is critical of the underlying assumptions that
may have made the initial law and economics writings attractive to
some. One of my aims is to determine whether this work has had an
impact on the willingness of courts to adopt the teachings of law
and economics scholarship.
B.

Happiness and Utility

More recently, scholars have begun considering a topic that is
even more fundamental than advances in behavioral economics.
What does it mean to be better off? This leads to more specific
questions. For example, how do you measure whether someone is
better off? Does better off mean a subjective measure of happiness
or is it a function of objective measures like longevity, the availability of heath care, or a healthy diet?51 Revealed preference theory
47. See, e.g.,

TALl SHAROT, THE OPTIMISM

BIAS: A

TOUR OF THE IRRATIONALLY

POSITIVE BRAIN (2011).

48. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 45, at 119-28.
49. See materials cited supra note 37.

50. For a discussion, see Harrison, supra note 29, at 1352-61.
51. See generally ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST FOR STATUS (1985) (discussing the role of status as a motivator
in individual behavioral choices); BRUNO S. FREY & ALOIS STUTZER, HAPPINESS AND
ECONOMICS: How THE ECONOMY AND INSTITUTIONS AFFECT HUMAN WELL-BEING

(2002); DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS (2006);JONATHAN HAIDT, THE
HAPPINESS HYPOTHESIS: FINDING MODERN TRUTH IN ANCIENT WISDOM (2006); JENNIFER MICHAEL HECHT, THE HAPPINESS MYrH: WHY WHAT WE THINK IS RIGHT IS
WRONG 133-46 (2007) (discussing literature on the linkage between material objects and
(2005);

happiness); RICHARD LAYARD, HAPPINESS: LESSONS FROM A NEW SCIENCE

MATTHIEU RIcARD, HAPPINESS:

A

GUIDE TO DEVELOPING LIFE'S MOST IMPOR-

SILL (Jesse Browner trans., Little, Brown & Co. 2006); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting,80 IND. L.J. 155, 165-81
(2005) (discussing social science research regarding people's ability to predict
their future feelings); Richard A. Easterlin, ExplainingHappiness, 100 PROC. NAT'L
AcAD. SCI. 11176 (2003); Richard A. Easterlin, Income and Happiness: Towards a UniTANT

fied Theory, 111 ECON. J. 465 (2001); Richard A. Easterlin, Will Raising the Incomes of
All Increase the Happiness of All?, 27J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 35 (1995); Interpersonal
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comes into play here as well. The standard economic assumption is
that people maximize utility by making choices they deem most satisfying. And, the theory goes, we know what maximizes that utility
by observing choices. The problem is that the way one anticipates
feeling as a result of a choice-in this case, the choice to make a
contract-does not always turn out to be how one actually feels. In
short, expected utility, the realm of traditional economic analysis,
52
does not necessarily match up with actual utility or happiness.
This realization is at the heart of ongoing studies about the
factors that account for happiness. For example, according to some
theories, people have a set level of happiness that they may rise
above or sink below, but only temporarily.5 3 The idea that contracts
are enforced to give a non-breaching party his or her expectancy
becomes entangled with the possibility that one may be just as
happy in the long run even if subject to a breach of contract without compensation. As extreme as it may seem, this gives rise to the
question of just how important it ultimately is to enforce all
contracts.

For example, suppose you have a contract to purchase a new
fancy sports car to be delivered in two months. At the time of expected delivery, the seller informs you that the car has been sold to
someone else and will not be replaced. Standard contract remedies
require awarding you the difference between the price you would
have paid for the car and what you will have to pay for a substitute.
But what we know now is that the successful purchase of the car
may have resulted in only a short-term boost in happiness. On a
practical level, you can relate to this by thinking of the number of
times you very badly wanted something-say, a new coat or jewelry-but were disappointed. In a few months, the sense of disappointment or desire is extinguished and the article actually turns
out not to be as important as it seemed.
Comparisonsof Well-Being (on Elster &John E. Roemer eds., 1991); Tiffany A. Ito &
John T. Cacioppo, The Psychophysiology of Utility Appraisals, in WELL-BEING: THE
FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 470 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999);
Richard E. Lucas et al., Reexamining Adaptation and the Set Point Model of Happiness:
Reactions to Changes in Marital Status, 84 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCH. 527 (2003). The
most comprehensive review of the literature is found in Peter Henry Huang, Happiness Studies and Legal Policy, 6 ANN. REv. L. & Soc. Scl. 405 (2010).
52. See Harrison, supra note 36, at 946-48.
53. Richard E. Lucas et al., supra, note 51. The notion of a set point is debatable as individuals may readjust their expectations. See Peter A. Ubel & George
Loewenstein, Pain and Suffering Awards: They Shouldn't be (Just) about Pain and Suffering, in LAW AND HAPPINESS 195 (Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein eds., 2010).
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Or consider one of your most miserable experiences-say, a
long hike during which it rained and you became lost. At the time,
it was the source of great unhappiness or disutility. Later, however,
the experience brings about a sense of achievement. The sense of
having experienced the negative event actually results in positive
feelings. As it turns out, studies indicate that there is a difference
between an experience and the memory of that experience.5 4 Time
can reshape your feelings. The question then becomes: what is the
relevant happiness or utility, that which occurs contemporaneously
with the experience or the feeling one has about it in years to
come?
In reality there are at least three ways to look at this. There is
the difference between expected utility (decisional) and what actually happens. In addition there is a difference between how you felt
at the time of the experience and how you recall it. Finally there
may be unpleasant experiences that are accurately recalled but result in a sense of pride or happiness, even if it is only the result of
being able to discuss the experience with others. These studies of
happiness have broad implications for contracts that are just beginning to be fleshed out. For example, promissory estoppel is based
on the idea that people's reliance on promises may be to their detriment. The suggestion is that reliance on a promise has made their
positions worse. It is likely that when people hear that a promise has
been broken, they are less happy than had they learned otherwise.
There is little distinction here between being injured and suffering
some other type of loss. At least some studies suggest that people
"get over" these losses and return to their ex ante state of happiness.
It has already been suggested that these findings warrant a reassessment of tort remedies. 55 The logic of this argument applies equally
to contract remedies, at least in non-commercial settings. Enforcing
promises may not make that much difference and expectancy may
be overrated as a contract remedy.
I want to avoid too broad of a statement about the personal
impact of enforcing or not enforcing awards of contract damages.
Contract law and even promissory estoppel play an important role
in reducing transaction costs. If these contracts and promises are
54. Daniel Kahneman et al. capture this distinction, distinguishing "decision
utility" from "experienced utility." See Daniel Kahneman, Peter P. Wakker &
Rakesh Sarin, Back to Bentham?Explorations of Experienced Utility, 112 Q.J. EcoN. 375
(1997).
55. See Andrew J. Oswald & Nattavudh Powdthavee, Death, Happiness, and the
Calculationof Compensatory Damages, in LAw AND HAPPINESS 217 (Eric A. Posner &
Cass R. Sunstein eds., 2010).
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not enforced, transaction costs and risk would increase. The increase in costs of transacting may lead to fewer resources available
for other sources of happiness. In addition, risk itself is typically
something people pay for or avoid. In effect, even if people eventually reach their original levels of happiness, they may incur happiness-reducing costs in that process. If one adds to this that the
parties are not individuals but business entities, the analysis is even
murkier.
The question in the context of this study is fairly straightforward. Since this survey was initially conducted, both behavioral economics and happiness studies have captured the attention of a
great number of economists and those who apply economics to
law. 56 The overall impact, if any at all, would be to decrease the
attractiveness of traditional economic models as a supplement to
judicial analysis. I consider this hypothesis in the section that
follows.
III.
SURVEY RESULTS
A.

An Overview

One must be cautious about making claims about the results of
an informal study like this one. Nevertheless, a few judgments are
relatively easy to make. Some are about quantitative matters and
some are more qualitative and, admittedly, even impressionistic.
With respect to quantitative matters, based on the sample examined
here, one cannot conclude that law and economics scholarship has
increased its citation frequency since the initial study twenty-five
years ago. As noted above, with respect to. the original sample there
were seventy-six citations as of 1987. Since that time there have
been 127 more. In the initial period, citations to Judge Posner's
book accounted for 27% of the citations. In the second period, his
book (in all editions) accounted for 40% of the citations.
Because it is difficult to compare these time periods in any exact way, I developed a standard of measurement. The average age
of the works examined in the initial study at the time of that study
was eleven years. Since there were fifty-eight works examined, a
computation can be made for what I am going to call "article-years."
This can be thought of as the cumulative number of years all articles were available for citation. The first sample included a total of
56. See materials cited at supra notes 37 & 51.
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638 article-years. 5 7 If the seventy-six citations are divided by 638 article-years the result is 0.12 citations per work per year.
In the twenty-five year period since the initial study, there were

127 citations to those same works. Although there were more total
citations, there were also substantially more article-years since each
article is now twenty-five years older. 58 In fact, twenty-five years multiplied by fifty-eight works means there were 1,450 article-years. Dividing the number of citations by article-years results in a citation
rate of 0.087 citations per article-year. In short, the articles in the
initial sample have been cited more often overall in the second period but substantially less often per article-year than they were in
the period leading up to 1987. Of course this may not be indicative
of an ultimate loss of influence. As noted earlier, once a case has
been cited, later courts may simply cite the case in which the work
was originally cited. 59 This may explain a decline in citations.
Another reason for not equating these quantitative results with
influence relates to the different perspectives one may take. If the
total number of citations is an indicator of influence, the second
twenty-five year period would appear to be one of greater influence.
After all, law and economics as an area of scholarship is cited more
often. This could be strictly a function of having more years to be
influential but that would not distract from the overall or gross impact. On the other hand, there are more years and fewer cites per
article-year than in the initial period. This would suggest that the
reliance on law and economics, while obviously still positive, is declining. In effect each article becomes less influential as time
passes. 60 To put this differently, with respect to the original study,
articles were available to be cited during a much shorter period of
time than in the second study. In breaking the analysis into averages, my goal is to make sure that the original sample's impact is
not understated simply because it was available for fewer years.
Another hypothesis that could explain the declining citation
rate of the original sample is that the earlier works are being replaced or crowded out by newer ones. There is no methodologically
sound way of determining if this is the case, but in an effort to gain
57. This was calculated by multiplying 58 by 11.

58. In effect twenty-five years were added to the eleven year average found as
of 1987.

59. A next step in the analysis would be to focus on those works that have
been influential and to determine the frequency of citation of the holding they

influenced.
60. One could say that the marginal influence of the sample is still positive
but declining.
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some insight I selected twenty articles using the same subjective
standards used to select the original. Some articles are by the same
authors as those in the original sample and others are by younger
but prolific scholars. 6 1 On average, the articles were published
eleven years ago, which means a total of 220 article-years. The total
number of citations was five, which means an average of 0.02 citations per article-year. 62 In contrast, over the last eleven years the
original sample has been cited a total of forty-five times over 495
article-years. This means a citation rate of 0.07 times per articleyear. Even if Judge Posner's book, with twenty-one of the total citations, is excluded, the citation rate is 0.05 citations per article per
year. 63 If these numbers are representative of the aggregate, one
interpretation is that the older articles have not been crowded out
by newer ones.
There are of course a number of reasons why the more recent
works might be cited less frequently by courts. An educated guess is
that the original set of articles addressed specific mainstream doctrinal issues in contract law that were likely to be the subject of dispute.6 4 Although it is admittedly impressionistic, the more recent
articles, or at least those selected here, tend to be more theoretical.
Of course theoretical works may lead to several more practical ones
that are cited, and their importance will never be fully gauged. As a
general matter, the analysis so far suggests that the pre-1990 works
in law and economics as they relate to contract law represent the
core law and economic scholarship of the area. They are thus more
likely to be cited.
Another possible explanation for a lower citation rate is the
huge volume of literature in behavioral economics. This literature
calls into question some of the basic assumptions of the traditional
analysis that characterized most of the works included in the original sample. The more nuanced view of law and economics resulting
from the teachings of behavioral economics could result in some
61. The list is found in Appendix B.
62. This rate is calculated by dividing 5 into 220. The average is used here in
order to normalize for the different lengths of time articles were available in the
first sample as compared to the second sample.
63. There is little doubt that the presence ofJudge Posner's An Economic Analysis of Law accounts for a great deal of the "power" of the original sample. Because
Judge Posner's book has gone through multiple editions one could argue it should
be included in both samples. The propositions for which it is typically cited were in
the first few editions and it would be misleading to count them as part of the
recent sample of scholarship.
64. One can get a feel for this by comparing the titles in Appendix A with
those in Appendix B.
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hesitation to rely on the earlier and more conventional works. To
examine this question, I determined the number of instances the
phrases "behavioral economics" and "behavioral law and economics" were used at any time in the "allcases" database. There were
only seven citations with the oldest being in the year 2000. Interest65
ingly, two of the seven were citations to a work by Judge Posner.
To further examine this issue, I selected a sample of articles
addressing directly the subject of behavioral economics. 66 Again the
sample was not random but based on my judgment about which
articles were likely to be influential. The thirteen articles selected
were cited a total of ten times. Although they were recognized in a
positive manner, there was no indication that those articles had
been used by judges to reject the conventional economic analysis of
contract law in any but a tangential manner. 6 7 In short, at least
based on a citation analysis, one would have to reject the hypothesis
that conventional law and economics articles are relied on less frequently because of the onslaught of behavioral economics works. 68
In one more exercise, I examined the possibility that the rapidly developing literature on happiness as an alternative to expected utility as a measure of utility has had an impact on law and
economics citations. Perhaps the most comprehensive treatment of
happiness as it relates to law is a collection of articles published by
The Journal of Legal Studies in 2009, and subsequently published in
book form in 2010.69 These articles were devoted to a variety of
topics. Searches using a number of terms resulted in no findings
that this literature has had an impact.7 0 It may be that it is too soon
to detect an impact. On the other hand, the application of that
literature to contract law is not as obvious as the application of
traditional economics, 71 and most of the theories related to happi65. Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50
L. REV. 1551 (1998).
66. These are found in Appendix C.
67. For example, half of the citations were to John D. Hason & Douglas A.
Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112
HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999), which discusses the way in which the presentation of
data or information can impact markets. These works comment on the standard
economic assumptions but have not yet influenced actual contract rules.
68. In order to be completely accurate, it should be noted that even this hypothesis rests on the assumption that law and economics articles are relied upon
less. This is based on citation and cannot account for the other ways in which law
and economics scholarship may affect judicial reasoning.
69. LAW AND HAPPINESS (Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein eds., 2010).
70. The search terms used were the authors' names, the titles of the articles,
and the title of the collection.
71. For a detailed discussion, see Harrison, supra note 36, at 987-88.
STAN.
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ness and law are insufficiently developed to be operational at this
72
time.
In sum the sample selected twenty-five years ago is cited less
frequently. One might posit that those articles have been superseded by more recent scholarship but that does not appear to be
the case. In fact, overall, it appears that citation to law and economics works has become less frequent. Hypotheses that this is the result of inroads made by behavioral economics or by happiness
studies cannot be supported on the basis of the data collected here.
B. A Closer Look
1. Some Quantitative Observations
A closer look at the data reveals some outcomes that are inconsistent with a view that the influence of law and economics scholarship has declined. For example, in the 1987 study, thirty-three of
the citations to law and economics scholarship were by federal
courts and fourteen of those were by the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals. 73 This likely reflected the acceptance by Judges Posner
and Easterbrook of the law and economics approach. In the post1987 period there were sixty-seven citations by federal courts and
only nineteen were by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Although it is not clear that this is statistically significant, the very
clear implication is that the influence of law and economics scholarship has spread beyond the Circuit with which it is most readily
identified. A specific example of this process is Richard Epstein's
1984 article on terminable-at-will contracts. 74 In the 1987 study, the
article had been cited five times and in all instances it was by the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 7 5 Since then, it has been cited
twelve more times and only three of the new citations are by the
Seventh Circuit.
While this growing influence of law and economics scholarship
holds true from an overall perspective, it is not a uniform phenomenon. One curious example is Anthony Kronman's seminal article
on mistake and the duty to disclose information in the context of
contract formation. 76 The article presents the traditional economic
argument for not requiring parties to a contract to disclose infor72. See generallyJeffrey L. Harrison, Book Review, 21 U. FLA.J.L. & PuB. POL'Y
413 (2010) (reviewing LAw AND HAPPINESS, supra note 69).
73. See Appendix A.
74. Epstein, supra note 19.
75. See Appendix A.
76. Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7J. LEGAL S-rUD. 1 (1978); see alsoJeffrey L. Harrison, RethinkingMistake and
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mation that they have invested to gather. Kronman's theory is that
people invest in information when they are able to internalize the
benefits of that investment. This investment, so the argument goes,
assists the process of resources finding their way to their most valuable uses. 77 If parties to a contract were always required to disclose
information, they would be unable to internalize the benefits of
their information gathering and valuable investment would decline.
When information is not discovered by virtue of an investment,
78
there is no efficiency rationale for allowing non-disclosure.
In the 1987 study, Kronman's work was found to have been
cited four times. In all cases, it was by the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals. By 2011 the article had been cited seven more times and
all but one of the citations were by the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals. Although the Kronman article presents an economic rationale for disclosure and non-disclosure, it has typically been cited to
support non-disclosure. 79 Of the eleven total citations, seven are
found in opinions written by Judge Posner. This suggests that some
scholarly works may become favorites of particular judges and be
cited whenever a case arises that deals with the issue addressed by
the article. Thus a work of scholarship may become more frequently cited as its appeal spreads to judges in other courts or it
may be repeatedly cited by the same judge as it becomes part of his
or her mental library. In the second case, the work is less influential
than in the first case. In addition it is important to keep in mind
that the scholarship may fall out of the picture completely as subsequent courts cite the court that was initially influenced.
As a more general matter, the patterns of citation suggest that
law and economics scholarship is relied on more frequently when
the law is not clear or is in the process of change. As already noted,
wide citation to Richard Epstein's article on employment termination likely is a function of change in the law of terminable-at-will
employment. The article by Charles Goetz and Robert Scott on liquidated damages is also cited relatively frequently, and in this in80
stance the law seems to be on the move as well.
Nondisclosure in Contract Law, 17 GEO.
Kronman's article).
77. Kronman, supra note 76, at

MASON.

L. Riv. 335 (2010) (discussing

2.

78. Id. at 13-14.
79. The lone exception appears to be United States v. Mahaffy, No. 05-CR-613,
2006 WL 2224518 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2006).
80. Goetz & Scott, supra note 14. In part this trend can be traced to a policy of
enforcing the liquidated damages clause if the clause is reasonable at the time of
contracting or at the time of the breach. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcrS
§ 356 (1981); see also United States v. Hayes, 633 F. Supp. 1183, 1185 (M.D.N.C.
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On the other hand, the substance of Kronman's article explains why well-settled law makes economic sense. Scholarship defending the status quo when it is not under attack is not as likely to
be needed by a court.
2.

A More Qualitative Examination

Although the numbers suggest varying conclusions with respect to the influence of law and economics, an examination of actual decisions indicates that an economic way of thinking about
issues has penetrated judicial reasoning. Here the focus is not on
the number of citations. Instead, the inquiry centers on the development of an economically influenced manner of reasoning and
discussion and on the diverse courts which employ this reasoning.
For example, although the theory of efficient breach hardly explains the evolution of the expectancy measure of damages, courts
have an appreciation of how the theory supports expectations. Thus
as Justice Mosk of the Supreme Court of California observed in a
1995 opinion, "The efficient breach occurs when the gain of the
breaching party exceeds the loss to the party suffering the breach,
allowing movement of resources to their more optimal use. Contract law must be careful 'not to exceed compensatory damages if it
doesn't want to deter efficient breaches.' "81 In gauging the impact
of law and economics on the vocabulary of courts, most telling is
the trend in the use of the term. As noted earlier, "efficient breach"
is used 131 times as determined by the methodology employed
1986) (stating that it has been the modern trend to allow liquidated damages
clauses in contracts); Rohlin Constr. Co. v. City of Hinton, 476 N.W.2d 78, 79
(Iowa 1991) (recognizing a change in contractual interpretations consistent with
the trend of favoring liquidated damages).
81. Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669, 682 (Cal. 1995)
(Mosk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 107-08 (3d ed. 1986)). At the heart of the efficient
breach notion is that no party is made worse off (at least in a monetary sense) by
virtue of the breach. See also Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 61 F. Supp. 2d
1326 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (noting that intentional breaches are sometimes encouraged
when they are efficient and wealth-enhancing).
This is not to say that every court adopting the economic view has applied it
correctly. One case in which the application appears to be incorrect is Specialty
Tires of America, Inc. v. CIT Group/Equipment Financing Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 434
(W.D. Pa. 2000). In CIT Group, the court reasoned that it was efficient to excuse
the performance of a party who would otherwise be in breach of contract because
the plaintiff would simply be put in the position it was in before making the contract and, thus, would be no worse off. 82 F. Supp. 2d at 441. In actuality, the
plaintiff was made worse off if one views the making of the contract as having
created a legitimate expectancy.
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here. The term was only used eleven times as of 1987, when the
initial study was conducted.
Similarly, in the context of an early termination fee, a federal
court in New York noted the usefulness of penalty clauses:
There are several potential benefits to an agreed punitive measure of damages. A party who wants to convince others of her
trustworthiness may choose to accept a penalty clause in order
to increase her credibility. Similarly, a penalty clause may compensate a seller for a high risk of default, enabling the seller to
take greater risks and charge lower prices. In addition, a penalty clause may be the only means to provide true compensation to a promisee whose idiosyncratic wants would not be
compensated by the standard expectation measure of contract
damages.82
The court expressed skepticism about what it termed the "Chi-

cago" approach to the s.. but seemed83to accept possiUe economcally beneficial effects of such clauses.
Economic reasoning has also been brought to bear in the analysis of contingency fees. Thus according to the Texas Supreme
Court:
Attorney contingency fee contracts serve two main purposes.
First, they allow plaintiffs who cannot afford to pay a lawyer upfront to pay the lawyer out of any recovery. Second, because
they offer the potential of a greater fee than might be earned
under an hourly billing method, such contracts compensate
the attorney for the risk that the attorney will receive no fee
whatsoever if the case is lost. The lawyer in effect lends the
value of his services, which is secured by a share in the client's
8
potential recovery.

4

82. Spirit Locker, Inc. v. Evo Direct, LLC, 696 F. Supp. 2d 296, 306 (E.D.N.Y.
2010).
83. Id. at 307-08. As in the case discussed immediately above, this court also
stumbled a bit on its economic analysis. One of its concerns about liquidated damages clauses is that they may discourage the efficient breach. Id. at 305. However,
this seems unlikely. A liquidated damages clause can be seen as giving one party
the "right" to performance similar to specific performance in that the party that
would prefer to breach will not do so. Like a right to specific performance, parties
may bargain for liquidated damage amounts that do not deter the efficient breach.
See JEFFRFY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 151-53 (5th ed.
2011).
84. Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex.
1997) (internal citations omitted); see also In re McCoy Farms, 417 BR. 17, 23
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2009); Ketchum v. Moses, 17 P.3d 735, 742 (Cal. 2001). But see

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law

24

NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW

[Vol. 68:1

Similar economic reasoning has been advanced to support the
use of form contracts. As an example, in a recent Ohio case, the
court observed:
[T]he law does not require that each aspect of a contract be
explained orally prior to signing the contract. A party to a contract is responsible for reading what he signs ....Nevertheless,

the Ohio Supreme Court has declined to require more specific
disclosures when arbitration is concerned, reasoning that form
contracts lower transaction costs and benefit consumers
85
through lower prices.
More broadly, in Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corporation, 6 the court
noted the potential application of the backbone of law and eco7-when
nomics-the Coase Theorem 8T
it discussed the possibility
that parties can contract around court-determined rules: "We
should recognize initially that, when those affected by a chosen default rule can easily bargain around it to agree to a mutually beneficial course, the rule choice will generally make little difference to
the parties' actual agreement."8 8 Indeed courts have recognized the
relevance of the Coase Theorem forty-seven times.89 This may not
Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399, 413 (T.C. 2000) (finding attorneys' fees to be
merely a cost of litigation).
85. Wallace v. Ganley Auto Grp., No. 95081, 2011 WL 2434093, at *6-7 (Ohio
Ct. App. June 16, 2011). The best-known examples of judicial recognition of the
capacity of form contracts to lower transaction costs are CarnivalCruise Lines, Inc. v.
Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593-94 (1991) and ProCD,Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451
(7th Cir. 1996).
86. 993 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1993).
87. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). For a
discussion of the Coase Theorem see JEFFRWy L. HARRISON &JUIEs TH UWiS, LAw
& ECONOMICS 81-100 (2008).
88. Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 612.
89. This is based on a search for "The Problem of Social Cost" in the "allcases" database of Westlaw. Not all of these instances involve contract law but, ultimately, the Coase Thereom is about the capacity of market transactions to settle
what would otherwise be legal disputes. Another example, albeit in the context of
a tort case, is Comet Delta, Inc. v. PateStevedore Co., 521 So. 2d 857 (Miss. 1988). The
case involved rice damaged by coal dust. The Mississippi Supreme Court noted:
Again assuming an ex ante perspective, which party could have prevented this
loss at the least cost? Assuming, for example, that it was necessary to fumigate
the rice and permit inspection by SGS Control Services, the buyer's agent, our
judicial task would be to identify factually the various precautionary options
open to the parties that might have prevented the contamination loss, and, as
well, the cost of each such option. Considering then those options open to
Comet Delta and, in turn, the options available to Pate, the law's burden
ought fall upon that party which, at zero transaction costs, could have prevented the loss at the least cost. That party is said to be the least cost risk
bearer, to use the increasingly familiar lingo. Cf. Goetz, Law and Econom-
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be an impressive number for an article as well known to economists
and lawyers as Coase's classic, 90 but for the first twenty years of its
existence-from 1960 to 1980-it was cited but six times. 9'
Also pertinent as a measure of the penetration of economic
analysis into judicial opinion is the use of the term "transaction
costs." Transaction costs are the costs incurred in reaching an
agreement. 9 2 High transaction costs deter contract formation and
low ones make contract formation more likely. The most wellknown application of transaction costs is found in Coase's The Problem of Social Cost.93 Again using the database "allcases," the term ap-

pears a total of 653 times. 94 Prior to 1990, the term was used 139
times times, and before 1960, the year The Problem of Social Cost was
published, the term appeared but once. 95 By 1987, the date of the

initial study, the term had appeared ninety-three times. In the
twenty-five years since 1987, the usage of the term tripled over the
number of times used since 1987. Clearly transaction costs have become part of the day-to-day vocabulary of courts.
These examples are far from exhaustive. The breadth of the
topics addressed, as well as the jurisdictions represented, suggest
ics, 118-27 (1984). In other words, that party which,

ex ante, could have prevented the loss at the least cost should be burdened in law with the risk and
consequently the loss ....
The seminal discussion of this idea is Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3J. Law & Economics 1, 1-28 (1960).
Id. at 862.
90. By contrast the article has been cited 3100 times in works of legal scholarship. This is based on searching "The Problem of Social Cost" in the Westlaw "TPALL" database.
91. See, e.g., Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 n.7
(2d Cir. 1968). Interestingly, this first citation was by Judge Friendly, who regarded
the Coasian solution as "unlikely to occur in real life." Id.
92. The concept was first introduced by Ronald H. Coase in his 1937 article
The Nature of the Firm using the terminology "marketing costs." Ronald H. Coase,
The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386, 394 (1937). In his 1960 article, The
Problem of Social Costs, he refers to the "cost of market transactions." Coase, supra
note 87, at 15. The term "transaction costs" seems to appear more generally in
both his book and short articles. See generally Ronald H. Coase, THE FiRM THE MARKET AN1n THE LAw 174-79 (1990); Ronald H. Coase, The Nature oftheFirm: Origin, 4
J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 3 (1988).
93. Coase, supra note 87, at 15.
94. Specifically excluded were cases that also included any of the following
terms: "bank," "institution," "refinancing." These terms would likely be found
when transaction cost actually refers to a fee. Not all instances in which the term
was used were examined but a random check of seventy-five instances indicated
the usage was consistent with the Coasian meaning.
95. In this one instance the term is actually "financial transaction costs,"
which is not consistent with modern usage. State ex rel. Cowles v. Butts, 170 So.
715, 716 (Fla. 1936).
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that economic reasoning, or an effort to apply it, has become common in opinions dealing with contract matters. This is the sort of
subterranean effect that may not be fully appreciated by focusing
only on citations.
CONCLUSION
Revisiting a work you completed twenty-five years ago can be a
sobering exercise. That early examination of the first wave of law
and economics scholarship suggested that citation was infrequent.
There are a number of explanations, including the most important
one: much of contract law was consistent with the teachings of law
and economics. Still, two interesting conclusions seem to be relatively safe. First, law and economics was not responsible for any of

the current trends in contract law at the time. Second, although
citations were not frequent, they were disproportionately found in
courts that were promoting a law and economics perspective. Nevertheless, a citation count alone may not fully capture long-term
effects.
The current effort produced a more complex combination of
results. With respect to the original sample of scholarship selected,
citation frequency has declined. It does not appear that these earlier works have been replaced by newer ones or that they have been
affected by the more nuanced view offered by behavioral economics. As in the initial study, it would be difficult to conclude that law
and economics scholarship has played a role in shifting any basic
96
contract law tenets.

Principally law and economics has provided a rationale for already existing positions. This is somewhat consistent with the view
that common law judges, who were not familiar with economics in a
formal sense, either intuitively responded to the logic or coincidentally arrived at economically sensible outcomes. 9 7 More importantly, this update suggests that citation frequency may not be the
best measure of the influence of law and economics generally. The
reasoning and vocabulary of courts at all levels and in the context
of a variety of issues indicates that, whether by way of citation or
not, law and economics has penetrated contract law. Thus, returning to my original question, does scholarship matter? The answer appears to be that some of it does, but tracing this influence is
not an easy matter.
96. As one would expect in all cases of appeals to authority, citation seems to
be most frequently in the context of areas of law that are evolving.

97. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 249-53.
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APPENDIX A
Guide to notations:
N = Case cites article in string cite or for matter unrelated to
economic analysis of contract law
R = Economic reasoning of article discussed in opinion
I = Case appears influenced by economics found in Article
* = Cases were decided after the initial study in 1987
Expanded 1987 Study
Elliot Axelrod, Specific Performance of Contractsfor Sales of Goods:
Expansion or Retrenchment in the 1980's, 7 VT. L. REV. 249 (1982).
John H. Barton, The Economic Basis of Damagesfor Breach of ConLEGAL STUD. 277 (1972).

.tract, I J.

Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208, 1217
(8th Cir. 1981). (I).
Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract,DamageMeasures, and
Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 273 (1970).
Lieberman v. Emp'rs Ins. of Wausau, 419 A.2d 417, 425
(N.J. 1980). (R).
Vines v. Orchard Hills, Inc., 435 A.2d 1022, 1026 (Conn.

1980). (R).
Layton Mfg. Co. v. Dulien Steel, Inc., 560 P.2d 1058, 1061
n.15 (Or. 1977) (concurring opinion). (R).
Robert L. Birmingham, Legal and Moral Duty in Game Theory:
Common Law Contract and Chinese Analogies, 18 BUFF. L. REV. 99
(1969).

CAL.

David W. Carroll, Four Games and the Expectancy Theory, 54 S.
L. REv. 503 (1981).

Kenneth W. Clarkson, Roger LeRoy Miller & Timothy J. Muris,
LiquidatedDamages v. Penalties: Sense or Nonsense?, 1978 Wis. L. REv.
351.
*Willard Packaging Co. v. Javier, 899 A.2d 940 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2006). (N).
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Wilmington Hous. Auth. v. Pan Builders, Inc., 665 F.
Supp. 351, 354 (D. Del. 1987). (N).
Koenings v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 377 N.W.2d 593,
604 n.11 (Wis. 1985). (1).
Wassenaar v. Panos, 331 N.W.2d 357, 362 n.7 (Wis. 1983).
(I).
Lefevere v. Sears, 629 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. App. 1981).
(N).
Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI.
L. REv. 947 (1984).

*Akers v. RSC Equipment Rental, Inc., No. 4:09CV2022
HEA, 2010 WL 5479678, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 31, 2010). (N).
*Akers v. RSC Equipment Rental, Inc., No. 4:09CV2022
HEA, 2010 WL 2757284, at *3 (E.D. Mo. July 12, 2010). (N).
*Margiotta v. Christian Hosp. Ne. Nw., 315 S.W.3d 342,
346 (Mo. 2010). (N).
*Lynn v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 03-2662-GTV-DJW, 2005 WL
701270, at *7 n.29 (D. Kan. 2005). (N)
*Garcia v. Kankakee Cnty. Hous. Auth., 279 F.3d 532, 536
(7th Cir. 2002). (N).
*Mackenzie v. Miller Brewing Co., 623 N.W.2d 739, 743
n.9 (Wis. 2001). (N).
*Foster v. BJC Health Sys., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1287
(E.D. Mo. 2000). (N).
*Riad v. 520 S. Mich. Ave. Assocs., 78 F. Supp. 2d 748, 755
(N.D. Ill. 1999). (N).
*Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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*Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 540 N.W.2d 277,
281 (Iowa 1995). (N).
*Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 473 N.W.2d 268, 283
(Mich. 1991). (R).
*McKnight v. Gen. Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 109 (7th
Cir. 1990). (N).
*R.S. & V. Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 917 F.2d 348, 352
(7th Cir. 1990). (R).
*Kern v. Levolor Lorentzen, Inc., 899 F.2d 772, 783 (9th
Cir. 1990). (N).
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*McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69, 74
(Tex. 1989). (N).
*Bullock v. Auto. Club of Mich., 444 N.W.2d 114, 132 n.2
(Mich. 1989). (R).
*Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 399 (Cal.
1988). (N).
*Borowski v. DePuy, Inc., 850 F.2d 297, 301 (7th Cir.
1988). (N).
Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 438 (7th Cir.
1987). (R).
Miller v. Int'l Harvester Co., 811 F.2d 1150, 1152 (7th Cir.
1987). (R).
Tyson v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 710 Pension Fund,
811 F.2d 1145, 1148 (7th Cir. 1987). (R).
Sarnoff v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 798 F.2d 1075, 1080
th Cir. 1986). (R).
Kumpf v. Steinhaus, 779 F.2d 1323, 1326 (7th Cir. 1985).
(R).
Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability:A CriticalReappraisal, 18
J.L. & ECON. 293 (1975).
*Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 51 Cal. App. 4th 1519, 1532
(Ct. App. 1997). (N).
*Williams v. Patton, 821 S.W.2d 141, 147 (Tex. 1991). (R).
Barco Auto Leasing Corp. v. PSI Cosmetics, Inc., 478
N.Y.S.2d 505, 512 (Civ. Ct. 1984). (N).
Daniel A. Farber, Reassessing the Economic Efficiency of Compensatory Damages for Breach of Contract, 66 VA. L. REv. 1443 (1980).
CharlesJ. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, EnforcingPromises:An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980).
*McKinley Allsopp, Inc. v. Jetborne Int'l, Inc., No. 89 Civ.
1489, 1990 WL 138959, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 1990). (N).
Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM Corp., 522 F. Supp. 1257, 1282
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). (R).
Forty Exchange Co. v. Cohen, 125 Misc. 2d 475, 492 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1984). (N).
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and the Just CompensationPrinciple: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model
and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 554 (1977).
*Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 646 F.3d 1214,
1221 n.44 (9th Cir. 2011). (R).
*Spirit Locker, Inc. v. EVO Direct, LLC, 696 F. Supp. 2d
296, 306 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). (R).
*Kunelius v. Town of Stow, 588 F.3d 1, 14 n.10 (1st Cir.
2009). (N).
*Willard Packaging Co. v. Javier, 899 A.2d 940, 947 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 2006). (R).
*Arrowhead School Dist. No. 75 v. Klyap, 79 P.3d 250, 257
(Mont. 2003). (I).
*Conagra, Inc. v. Nierenberg, 7 P.3d 369, 385 (Mont.
2000). (N).
*MetLife Capital Fin. Corp. v. Wash. Ave. Assocs., 732 A.2d
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*Nat'l Emergency Servs., Inc. v. Wetherby, 456 S.E.2d 639,
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*Wallace Real Estate Inv., Inc. v. Groves, 881 P.2d 1010,
1018 (Wash. 1994). (N).
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100, 105, 106, 107, 108 (N.J. 1994). (N).
*Mosiurchak v. Senkowski, 839 F. Supp. 1035, 1039
(S.D.N.Y. 1993). (N).
*Rohlin Constr. Co. v. City of Hinton, 476 N.W.2d 78, 80
(Iowa 1991). (R).
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1990). (N).
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Ct.1989). (N).
Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284,
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Harding v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 602 F.2d 1181, 1182 n.2
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